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This paper aims at contributing to the analysis of brain drain by focusing on countries in 
conflict. Here, experiences of migrants from Bosnia have been collected in order to identify 
specific determinants and patterns of migration in the conflict settings. Then, these 
observations were used to develop a theoretical model of conflict-induced migration, which 
identify possible mechanism of self-selection of migrants. Finally, a micro-level analysis of 
determinants of conflict-induced migration from Bosnia has been conducted, in order to 
provide empirical evidence for the theoretical model. The analysis was based on the World 
Bank’s BiH LSMS 2001 household survey data. The main aim of this study was to identify 
possible self-selection mechanism of conflict-induced migration and its impact on the 
migration rates of highly skilled individuals. The empirical evidence supports the theoretical 
prediction of a mechanism of self-election present in the conflict-induced migration setting.  
 







Two different trends affect increased interest of economists in the analysis of 
brain drain. First is increased popularity of new growth theories which give higher 
importance to the human capital, as a key engine of economic growth of a country. 
Second is migration from developing to developed countries which accelerated in 
recent years, with a trend of increased proportion of highly skilled migrants. The 
migration of highly skilled individuals from less developed countries, which already 
lack human capital, to more developed countries, where this capital is already 
                                                 




abundant, becomes one of the key obstacles for faster pace of the catch-up process of 
developing countries with developed countries. “There is a strong consensus that 
deficiency in human capital is a major cause of poor countries remaining poor” 
(Stark et al., 1998).  
Besides these two trends, there is a third trend that motivated the analysis 
presented in this paper. Along with economic type of emigration, recent years have 
witnessed increased number of conflicts which were characterized by mass forced 
resettlement of people, both internally and internationally. One of the particular 
features of recent conflicts in Balkans has been mass resettlement of population2, 
typically called “ethnic cleansing”3. In order to understand the total consequences of 
conflicts, in the light of human capital based growth theories, we need to analyse the 
magnitude and consequences of the brain drain on the post-war economic recovery 
of a country. First, micro-level analysis needs to show whether individuals of 
different skills respond differently to the new set of push factors, which are in the 
case of conflicts not only economic, but also include risk factors. This analysis would 
identify possible self-selection mechanism of conflict-induced migration. Second, 
identified magnitude of brain drain from countries in conflict needs to be used to 
analyse consequences of such change in the human capital stock on the economic 
growth in countries in conflict, which may be of different kind compared to the 
consequences of brain drain from countries which did not experience a conflict, as 
conflict-induced brain drain is usually accompanied with large destruction of 
physical capital.  
Empirical studies of costs of conflicts have not measured the costs of emigration 
of highly skilled individual directly in quantifiable terms. This was mainly due to the 
lack of data on migration by skill level from countries in conflict. But, it may be 
argued that taking these costs into consideration in measuring total costs of a conflict 
                                                 
2 For example, during the 44-moths war in Bosnia, around 50% of population has been displaced, almost a half of 
that internally, whereas 27% of population has emigrated accross the border. 
3 Ethnic cleansing could be defined as a war strategy to artificially create a territory with majority of population of 




is extremely important, because these costs cause additional costs of lost output in 
post-conflict period. Human capital is considered as the most important determinant 
of economic growth. Countries which suffered large destruction of physical capital, 
plus losses of male labour force and skilled individuals, will face a painful period of 
post-war reconstruction and development. The pace of this development will depend 
on the resources available, or the proportion of highly skilled individuals remained 
in the country. Thus, it may be argued that loss of highly skilled, through a process 
of emigration known as “brain drain”, will negatively affect post-conflict economic 
recovery of a country.  
The literature on determinants of brain drain has mainly focused on the cases of 
“non-conflict-induced” migration, where economic factors predominantly influence 
individual behaviour. In the case of brain drain, these studies develop models of self-
selection mechanisms, explaining different impact of economic factors on migration 
decision of individuals with different skills (Borjas, 1987; Chiquiar and Hanson, 
2002). There were also several studies on the determinants of conflict-induced 
migration (see, for example, Ibanez and Kirchoff, 2001; Kondylis, 2008), but with no 
focus on brain drain and identification of the self-selection mechanism of this type of 
migration. Therefore, there is a need for studies which would shed more light on the 
process of conflict-induced brain drain, in order to improve our understanding of 
determinants and consequences of brain drain, as well as of consequences of 
conflicts. 
This paper focuses on a specific type of forced migration, which can be described 
as a conflict-induced migration, but which is one particular feature of more or less 
extensive forced eviction. The term “forced eviction”, as defined in Leckie (1994), 
involves “coercive forcing of people from their homes and communities against their 
will and nearly always without their free and informed consent”. This type of 
involuntary resettlement is common for many ethnic conflicts. It has characterised 
conflict in Bosnia during 1990s as well. So, the term “forced eviction” is being used in 




forced migration which, although involving  risk factors that force individuals to 
leave their homes, still might give certain degree of freedom to individuals to choose 
whether to stay or leave. This definition is not limited to the cases of conflict-induced 
migration, but also natural disasters and development induced displacements, which 
no rarely include such relocation of people without their consent. Thus, the findings 
of this study, if not to all, may be applicable to at least some the cases of conflict-
induced migration, the ones characterised by forced evictions. And, certain findings 
may be useful for other types of forced displacement as well. 
  This study seeks to address specific determinants that influence conflict-
induced migration flows and their composition by education level, as their 
observable skills, different then voluntary migration. Better understanding of the 
process of conflict-induced migration and factors that influence the magnitude of the 
brain drain as a consequence of a conflict, should be useful for estimating potential 
b e n e f i c i a l  e f f e c t  o f  t h i s  m o v e m e n t  o f  t e rtiary educated individuals on a source 
country’s economy, through remittances, human capital formation and network 
effect.  
  The paper is divided into the following sections. The next section presents the 
literature review. The third section introduces a reader into a specific case of conflict-
induced migration from Bosnia, during the 1992-1995 war, providing brief 
descriptive analysis of the data, and presents the results of semi-structured 
interviews conducted, which give additional insight into the specific features of this 
case. The theoretical model of conflict-induced migration is developed and presented 
in the fourth section. Section five tests the model presented in the previous section 
using the combined World Bank’s LSMS BiH 2001 and a Bosnian refugees’ survey 






  2. Literature review 
 
  The importance of emigration of highly skilled individuals from developing 
countries has been recognized from the beginning of this literature. Several papers 
(Grubel and Scott, 1966; Berry and Soligo, 1969) discussed welfare implications to a 
sending country of emigration of highly skilled individuals, at a rather theoretical 
level and with different predictions about the sign of this impact. This interest in the 
skill distribution among migrants in the literature was raised particularly after the 
recognition of the importance of human capital for economic growth in endogenous 
growth models (Lucas, 1988). 
The distribution of skills among population of migrants has generally been 
investigated in the framework of self-selection models, which offer explanation of the 
relationship between factors influencing emigration and skill composition of 
migrants. Thus, if highly skilled migrants are more responsive to specific 
determinants of migration in a particular migration context, it is said that migrants 
are positively self-selected. If the opposite is the case, and low skilled migrants are 
more likely to migrate in a response to specific determinants, then there is a negative 
self-selection of migrants. 
In his seminal paper, Borjas (1987: 551) offered a model of self-selection of 
migrants applying the Roy (1951) model in the migration context. The Roy (1951) 
model is an alternative explanation of workers’ labour market participation 
decisions. According to this model, individuals’ choice of a sector in which to 
participate is not exogenous, but a result of income maximization strategy, where 
they self-select into a sector that gives them highest expected earnings. The sign of 
self-selection, or the distribution of skills among individuals, will depend on the 
variance in earnings between sectors. Borjas (1987) applied this model to migration in 
order to explain the skill distribution of migrants, treating countries as alternative 




home and host country and those who have higher earnings in a host country are 
those who actually migrate. He assumes that these costs are time-equivalent and 
constant across all individuals. The model has ability to explain migration even if 
mean incomes between home and host countries are the same. In that case, 
individuals compare variance in the returns to skills between two countries. The sign 
of self-selection of migrants thus crucially depends on the wage dispersion between 
highly and low skilled in two countries. As richer countries have generally more 
equal distribution of income, the model predicts that self-selection of migrants in 
terms of their skills will generally have negative sign. The model has been 
empirically tested by comparing labour market performance of immigrants from 
Mexico to US, as a proxy for their unobservable skills, and found evidence of 
negative self-selection of Mexican immigrants in the US (Borjas, 1987). 
  Lack of data on migration by skills has limited the extent of empirical work on 
the self-selection of migrants in terms of their observable skills, i.e. their educational 
attainment. However, recent work on the collection of these data, first by Carrington 
and Detragiache (1998), and then by Docquier and Marfouk (2006), has opened the 
door to extensive work on the analysis of the determinants of brain drain. Brucker 
and Defoort (2006), in contrary to the prediction of the Borjas (1987) model, found 
evidence of positive self selection even if income inequality in a host country is 
higher than in a home country. McKenzie and Rapoport (2007: 24) investigated the 
role of migrant network in determining self-selection patterns of Mexico-US 
migration and found that the result of this effect in terms of self-selection depends on 
characteristics of the community. Thus, according to their empirical findings, 
migrants from communities with low migrant networks tend to be positively 
selected, and vice versa. Similar importance of migrant networks on determining the 
sign of self-selection was also found in Mora and Taylor (2006: 46), although it was 
found that this influence differs between different sectors of employment (farm 
versus non-farm). Orrenius and Zavodny (2001), in the analysis of self-selection of 




both countries decrease, while more strict immigration policies increase the skill level 
of migrants. In the context of conflict-induced migration, findings from this study 
would suggest that a conflict, commonly worsening economic conditions in a source 
country should increase the skill level of migrants, while relaxed immigration 
policies towards refugees by host countries should decrease it. But, empirical studies 
using data about migrants from conflict areas are required for testing these 
assumptions.  
  Most studies on self-selection have focused on the economic determinants of 
migration, and have not taken into account non-economic determinants and how 
they can affect the selection process. Still, Chiswick (2000: 12) states: “favorable self-
selectivity for labor market success would be expected to be less intense among those 
for whom migration is based primarily on factors other than their own labor market 
success”. Moreover, according to Ibanez and Velez (2003), “unlike results in 
traditional migration models, better educated household are less willing to displace; 
probably better off households are able to adopt protective measures or have more 
accurate information regarding the opportunities in reception sites and prefer not to 
displace”. 
The main contribution of this paper is that it develop a model in which 
additional specific factors of conflict-induced migration, besides the risk factor, are 
introduced. As it has been generally accepted that economic factors of migration in 
the case of conflict do not disappear, although their influence on migration decision 
may diminish (Van Hear, 1998; Chiswick, 2000), the model proposed in this paper 
accounts for these factors and their change during a conflict. This has been done in 
the framework of Stark and Taylor (1991) relative deprivation model. This model is 
useful for analysis of the determinants of conflict-induced migration in a way it 
accounts for community characteristics and individuals’ perceptions of their position 
in such a setting.  
The relative deprivation hypothesis, introduced by Stark and Taylor (1991), 




but also of relative income differences within a community. The further below the 
average income in a community the individual earns, the more prone to migrate in 
order to improve their relative income position in a community she is. In the context 
of conflict-induced migration, this hypothesis is important as it helps explain the role 
of change in both absolute income and relative deprivation caused by a conflict, 
which acts as a self-selection mechanism of conflict-induced migration. Compared to 
the self-selection models of voluntary migration (Borjas, 1987), where migration is a 
one-stage process which is expected to bring increase in expected wage to the 
migrant, in the model proposed in this thesis the migration is modelled in two stages. 
Conflict-induced migrants are assumed to be the ones who do not have an incentive 
to migrate before the conflict. As a conflict occurs, their expected wage in a home 
country changes. This is the first stage of migration process. In the second stage, 
individuals compare their expected wage in the case of no conflict, the expected 
wage as a conflict occurs, and the expected wage if they migrate. The larger the 
difference in expected wages between situations with and without a conflict, the 
stronger the incentive is to individuals to migrate. This is what is called a 
“restoration hypothesis” in this paper. The self-selection mechanism in this context is 
the fact that the difference between expected wages in situations with and without a 
conflict is larger for individuals with higher observable skills. Once a conflict occurs, 
individuals from conflict-affected areas are very often forced to displace to other 
areas. They suffer significant welfare losses. Others, in non-affected areas, are also 
affected by decrease in economic activity in a country. The more skilled individuals 
are, either displaced or non-displaced, the more significant the income losses are. 
Besides absolute income, their relative position compared to a reference group is 
worsened. It might be expected that the highly skilled have stronger incentive to 
leave refugee camps and restore their pre-conflict level of income and welfare, and 






  3. Bosnia during 1990s: Displacement issues 
 
 Conflict  in  Bosnia4 has begun in April 1992, and finished in December 1995, by 
US backed negotiations in Dayton, Ohio. This war has become characterized by mass 
resettlement of people, as a result of the main goal of some warring parties to 
“ethnically clean” a territory they control. As a consequence of this, about half of the 
population was resettled during the war, where approximately 25% was displaced 
internally, and the other 25% migrated abroad (MHRR, 2005). The result was almost 
total division of population along ethnic lines, although the vast majority of Bosnian 
municipalities were mixed (with just a few municipalities having more than 80% of 
ethnic majority) before the conflict (BiH Census 1991)5. 
There is a wide debate among academics and migration researchers about the 
actual choices forced migrants face (Turton, 2003; Ibanez and Velez, 2003). It can be 
argued that in some situations, such as “ethnic cleansing” activities during a conflict, 
displacement of population by a government as a consequence of large 
developmental projects, or displacement due to natural disasters, households are 
literally forcedly evicted from their houses without having a choice to stay6. 
Therefore, it is a question whether this movement should be taken into account in 
modelling the decision process of forced emigrants. But, forced emigration is not 
always, or is mainly not, as simple as moving from point A to point B, but is rather a 
sequential process of searching for a new home. These other choices could be 
modelled.  
First, two different types of municipalities are distinguished in which 
households could find themselves at the beginning of the war. Combination of the 
                                                 
4 There are different views of opposing parties in Bosnia about the type of this conflict. For those fighting on the 
government’s side (mainly Bosnians), it was aggression by Serbia (international conflict) and for separatists 
(mainly Serbs) it was a civil war. The International Crime Tribunal for ex-Yugoslavia (ICTY), in several of its 
statements and verdicts, declared it was a civil conflict with international features. 
5 www.bhas.ba 
6 Although, in the case of natural disaster and development induced displacement, there is no selection element, 




type of municipality and households’ characteristics has strongly influenced 
displacement decisions made at this point of time in the war, based on their 
probability of threat, or forced eviction. The first type of municipalities, which can be 
called type A municipalities, are those in which households have not faced a direct 
threat, since the municipality has been controlled by authorities of the same ethnic 
group as the household. The level of indirect threat to households has been different, 
dependent on the proximity of the place to the fighting zones. But, the threat has 
been random. Type B municipalities were those in which households of an ethnic 
origin different from a group controlling the municipality have faced direct threat 
and were forcedly evicted from their houses. These people usually did not have a 
choice to stay, and also were generally not allowed to take any valuables with them. 
This type of displacement mainly took place in the first few months of the war. This 
type of displacement has been non-random, but dependent on the combination of 
household’s characteristics and control of a municipality by a specific ethnic group. It 
is accepted that there were some households which were living in type B 
municipality, but decided not to leave; in spite of the risk such decision has carried. 
But, these were occasional cases, and it is expected that creating a variable by 
combining available data on ethnic origin and type of a local government in a 
municipality will capture the vast majority of cases. This variable should capture the 
effect of first “no-choice” displacement, or “forced eviction”, and take into account 
loss of physical capital and other characteristics of the new situation which may 
affect further displacement decisions made by these households. 
In addition, there have been takeovers of some municipalities by an opposing 
ethnic group. Since other ethnic groups have already been evicted, as explained 
above, this takeover usually implied eviction of the total population of the 
municipality, just at different points of time. 
Although some households crossed the border immediately after being forced 
to leave these municipalities, the common pattern was that households leaving these 




ethnic group first. From that new destination, households were then making further 
displacement decisions. 
There has been certain displacement observed from A type municipalities. 
Beside households displaced from B type municipalities, some households decided 
to leave their homes for different reasons, ranging from reasons predominantly 
motivated by security to reasons predominantly motivated by economic 
opportunities. 
Different types of displacement in Bosnia may be presented in the following 
diagram in the form of a decision tree, where the oval shapes represent different 
possible locations of origin or destination, squares possible decisions to be made, and 
diamonds different conditions affecting the decision. 
 



































In the above figure, blocks represent the place of living of a household, a 
diamond a position at which they make displacement choice, broken arrows for 
exogenous change and full arrows for endogenous change in the utility and place of 
living. Arrows labelled by W represent changes in the utility and place of living due 
to war, and those labelled by M these change due to the migration. The above figure 
presents the pattern of displacement in Bosnia, as described in the presentation of the 
results of semi-structural interviews, as well as the idea of two-stage process of 
conflict-induced migration, which is the main contribution of the theoretical model 
developed below. The first block is a pre-war position of households, in terms of 
their utility and place of living. As a war occurs, people move from 0 to 1 (move 
presented by two broken arrows denoted by W from the block 0 to two blocks at the 
lower level of figure). The position of these households and the degree of change in 
the utility at the outset of the war differs depending on whether they found 
themselves in a more “friendly” environment, a municipality controlled by their 
ethnic group (block 1A) or more “hostile” environment, municipality controlled by 
another ethnic group (block 1B). Those from a “hostile” environment (B type 
municipality) were forced to displace to the nearest municipality controlled by their 
ethnic group. After these displacements (broken arrow denoted by M1), households 
are making decision whether to stay in this (pre-war or new) municipality (diamond 
1A), to displace elsewhere within the country (block 2A), or to migrate abroad (block 
2B). 
The above analysis provides several interesting insights into the displacement 
patterns in Bosnia and Herzegovina. First, the experience of conflict is not standard 
across the country. Second, there has not been an optional choice involved in all 
types of displacement, i.e. we observe cases of “forced eviction” (M1). When placed 
literally into buses or given a deadline of a few hours to leave the town with well 
founded threat of being killed, households are not facing any optional choice. So, this 
decision should not be included into the model, since there is actually no element of 




households face a choice to stay in the home country as internally displaced or to 
seek refuge abroad, there is a decision process at work. Third, forced eviction has 
been non-random, meaning that households with specific characteristics were more 
likely to face displacement of “non-optional choice” type. After the forced eviction, 
the threat has been random. And finally, due to forced evictions, displaced 
households (ones from B type municipalities) have suffered more significant welfare 
losses than households from A type municipalities. 
Accordingly, there are two types of conflict-induced migrants: those who 
decide to flee from their homes, in order to reduce the risk and/or for economic 
motives; and those who, once forced to leave their homes, decide whether to displace 
internally or internationally. Migrants of the first type are making a decision which is 
more “stay or go” decision, On the other hand, second type migrants, once displaced 
from their original place of living, are making a decision which is more a destination 
choice decision, since their “stay” decision is a choice of a first displacement 
destination.  
The households who have been forcedly evicted from B type to A type 
municipalities (arrow M1 in Figure 1), not being able to transfer any physical capital, 
have suffered significant utility losses due to displacement. This may be an 
additional factor of displacement, as people may have a motivation to restore losses 
suffered during displacement. If tertiary educated individuals incurred greater 
welfare losses of emigration as a result of war (and having been forced to move), 
they may be more prone to emigrate in order to restore those losses. This would be a 
selection mechanism of conflict-induced displacement. 
Households which emigrate from a conflict are not only looking for 
opportunities abroad, but also for restoring pre-war economic and emotional well-
being. Consequently, the decision to emigrate will also depend on the difference 
between the current and pre-war economic situation of a household. If a household’s 




education level, place of living, this may be used to capture the differences in welfare 
losses of displacement between households. 
 
 
4. Theoretical model 
 
This model to a good extent follows the procedure used in the Stark and 
Taylor (1991) model, where they developed their relative deprivation hypothesis. 
Some of the steps of mathematical transformation were applied in the same way as in 
their model, in order to make these two comparable, to point out the main features of 
the new model and to show how it differs from voluntary migration models, such as 
the one presented in the Stark and Taylor (1991). The main difference in this sense is 
that the model proposed in this paper is presented as a two-stage process. In the first 
stage, households’ utility is exogenously affected by conflict (change from 0 to 1A in 
the Figure 1). In the second stage, households’ utility is changed as a result of their 
endogenous migration decision (change from 1A to either 2A or 2B in the Figure 1). 
This model is augmented by incorporating additional factors of forced migration 
from the model of Kirchhoff and Ibanez (2001). The most important feature of the 
proposed model is a new hypothesis based on the findings of descriptive analysis of 
conflict-induced migration from Bosnia, a “restoration hypothesis”, which is 
incorporated into the model. 
The  relative deprivation hypothesis states that households evaluate 
migration decisions not only on the basis of absolute, but also of relative income 
differences within a community. The further below the average community income 
the household earns, the more prone to migrate in order to improve their relative 
income position in a community it is. Under the assumption of a continuous income 
distribution within a range (x, x + ∆x), the relative deprivation function of a 
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Here,  RDi denotes the relative deprivation of household i,  yi income of 
household  i,  yh the highest income in the reference group, F(x) the cumulative 
distribution of income in a reference group, and 1 - F(x) the percentage of households 
whose income is higher than x. The equation in logarithmic form represents 
household i’s relative deprivation as a function (g) of cumulative income of other 
households in a reference group whose income is higher than that of i. 
The “restoration hypothesis” is based on the observation that conflicts affect 
households’ utility in terms of the increase in risk and decrease in income. The 
conflict works as a shock to the economy of a country and results in decrease in 
economic activity, increase of prices, fall of real wages, etc. which causes decrease in 
the value of the income element of a household’s utility function. As presented in the 
Figure 1, some households may experience additional decrease of both absolute 
income and relative position within a community (which affects their relative 
deprivation) through the losses of site-specific capital due to forced eviction and 
displacement (change from 1B to 1A). These additional losses are not random, since 
only households of specific characteristics were facing forced displacement. Based on 
this hypothesis, it may be expected that all households experience certain welfare 
losses due to conflict and that those which experience more significant losses, both 
absolute and relative, are more prone to migrate in order to restore pre-conflict level 
of utility. It could be also expected that households which were richer before the war 
will suffer higher absolute losses due to the war. Also, regarding the relative 
deprivation, it could be expected that richer households are worse-off in terms of 
change in relative deprivation, while poorer households may be even better-off in 
terms of change in relative deprivation, as a result of negative impact of a conflict on 




  In a simple framework, which applies to both voluntary and conflict-induced 
migration, a household will decide to migrate if: 
 
0 i id U U >          ( 2 )  
 
where Uid denotes utility of a household i after displacement, and Ui0 its utility with 
no displacement. But, if the two hypotheses presented above, first relative 
deprivation hypothesis developed by Stark and Taylor (1991) and restoration 
hypothesis proposed here, are incorporated into the model, it may generate different 
predictions. 
If it is assumed that the migration decision is influenced by absolute and 
relative income, as well as by security considerations, then: 
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where  U denotes utility, Y income, RD relative deprivation, S level of security, 
subscript  i  the  individual observation (which is a household in this case), and 
subscript j the displacement decision, j=0, 1, 2, where 0 is the pre-war situation, 1 is a 
situation during-the-war and before displacement, and 2 is case of migration. Also, 
δUij / δYij > 0, δUij / δRDij < 0 and δUij / δSij > 0. Here, S ranges between 0 and 1, where 0 
is a case of forced eviction (from 1B to 1A in the Figure 1), and 1 is a case of pure 
voluntary migration (from 1A to 2A or 2B).  
At this point, it is assumed that Ui0 > Ui2 > Ui1, where Ui0 denotes household’s 
utility before occurrence of conflict, Ui1 its new utility, after the start of conflict and 
Ui2 utility after migration. This assumption excludes the possibility of “bogus 
refugees”7. In this model, additional factors induce migration of households which 
would otherwise not migrate. 
                                                 
7 „Bogus refugees“ are defined as individuals who intend to migrate voluntarily and, in the case of a conflict, are 





  The net utility loss from war (affecting all households in a country) and non-
optional choice displacement (affecting a selected group of households) is then: 
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  This is the first stage of the conflict-induced migration process. In order to 
include RD into the model and make the necessary mathematical operations, we 
need to transform equation (1) from a definite integral into linear form. Following 
Stark and Taylor (1991), the first-order Taylor-series transformation of the equation 
(1) around Y0 is used8. After this transformation, Y1 is expressed as Y0 + w1, and RD1 is 
expressed as RD0 + RD’0w1, where w1= Y1 - Y0 is the household’s income loss from 
conflict, and RD’ a derivative of RD with respect to Y. Also, S1 can be now expressed 
as S0 + r1, where r1 is the household’s loss of security, or increase in risk as a result of 
conflict. When substituting these into equation (4), the utility can be expressed as a 
function of Y0, RD0, S0, w1 and r1. It is assumed here that w1 > 0, or Y1 < Y0. There may 
be some exceptions, but it is expected that majority of households will be worse-off 
in terms of income after the occurrence of the conflict (it changes from 0 to 1A in the 
Figure 1). Also, it may be assumed that relative deprivation decreases, because of 
decline in the average income, which may have a positive impact on migration of the 
tertiary educated, because their “positive” relative deprivation actually decreases 
(∆RD < 0). Finally, it is assume that r1 < 0, or S1 > S0, which means that risk increases 
with occurrence of a conflict. 
 
) , , , , ( ) , , ( ) , ' , ( 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 r w S RD Y S RD Y U r S w RD RD w Y U U φ = − + + + = ∆  
            ( 5 )  
 
where RD0’ is the change in relative deprivation with respect to Y, or maybe we 
could say “loss of positive relative” as a result of small decrease in income. 
                                                 
8 This transformation will hold only in cases of small changes in Y. This assumption is necessary for making 
Taylor’s transformation. Unfortunately, this might affect precision of estimation of the impact of large decrease in 




  This means that change in utility from U0 to U1, as a consequence of a conflict 
(and, in some cases, displacement) is a function of initial income, initial relative 
deprivation and loss of absolute income and security during a conflict (and 
displacement). Here, it is expected that ∆U1 < 0. 
  The net utility gain from migration, after the “shock”, or utility loss, is then: 
 
) , , , , , , , (
) , ' , ( ) , ' ' , (
) , , ( ) , ' , ( ) , , ( ) , , (
2 1 2 1 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 2 1 1 0 0 2 1 0
1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
r r w w S RD RD Y
r S w RD RD w Y U r r S w RD w RD RD w w Y U
S RD Y U r S w RD RD w Y U S RD Y U S RD Y U U
θ =
+ + + − + + + + + + =
− + + + = − = ∆
           ( 6 )  
 
  As a consequence, the migration decision in a conflict setting, when 
incorporating the effect of relative deprivation and relative loss of utility during 
conflict (and, in some cases, also forced displacement) depends on: the initial income 
level (Y0); initial relative deprivation (RD0) and relative deprivation after the forced 
eviction (RD1); initial level of security (S0), income loss of displacement (w1) and 
income gain of migration (w2),; as well as risk increase as a consequence of a conflict 
(r1) and risk decrease as a result of migration (r2). It is assumed here that at least one 
of the following inequalities holds: 
 
 Y 2 > Y1, or 
RD2 > RD1, or          (7) 
S2 > S1 
 
which means that a household migrates in order to increase its utility from 
either increase in absolute income, or in relative income, or in security. 
Any variable that increases the value of gain in income as a result of migration 
(w2) should have a twofold impact on a household’s incentive to migrate. First, it 




of this, it may be assumed that conflicts that have severe impact on incomes on the 
economy (thus increasing the value of w1) may act as self-selection mechanism for 
promoting emigration of tertiary educated individuals.  
The theoretical model presented above, compared to the model of Stark and 
Taylor (1991), incorporates the risk factor and takes into account the two-stage 
process of conflict-induced migration. Therefore, it may be considered as a more 
appropriate model to be used in the context of forced migration. Compared to 
Kirchhoff and Ibanez (2001) model, this model along with the risk factor incorporates 
two hypotheses that are considered important factors influencing forced migration 
decision process, namely relative deprivation of Stark and Taylor (1991) and a new 
“restoration” hypothesis proposed in this paper. Such a model may be considered as 
designed to match specific features of conflict-induced migration better than 
previous models. As certain other types of migration share the same features of 
migration process with conflict-induced migration captured here, such as multi-stage 
process and an influence of a “restoration” motive, this model may be also used for 
other types of displacement characterised by a non-randomly targeting shock that 
changes utility of households and influences their displacement decisions. 
 
 
  5. Empirical evidence 
  
Data 
Data on the education level and other individual characteristics of non-
migrants and internally displaced, as well as on types of places of living before and 
after migration, were collected from the World Bank’s Living Standard Measurement 
Survey (LSMS) conducted among 5,400 households in 25 municipalities in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina in 20019. This dataset is publicly available at the web site of BiH 
                                                 
9 There are later data available, but they are not relevant in our case, since this study is primarily interested in 




Statistical Agency10. The same data for refugees were collected from a survey 
conducted by the author. 
The LSMS survey has collected responses to the questions on migration from 
all members of a household older than 15. However, the displacement decision has 
been made predominantly at the household level11. Therefore, it is decided to take 
into account only responses provided by a head of household, thus having 5,400 
observations. But, in 2839 questionnaires, there has not been a response to the 
question on the current status of a household, thus making impossible to determine 
the value of the dependent variable. Also, these questionnaire were missing many 
other responses to the questions from the module 8 (on migration), thus making 
them unusable.  
The dataset has several important drawbacks related to this study. First, it 
does not contain the information on a household’s income, which makes proper 
empirical estimation of the theoretical model very difficult, as it is not possible to 
create key variables on income, relative deprivation and changes of both for each 
household by using exact data. This has been solved by creation of proxy variables 
from the data available, which is explained in details below. Second, the LSMS 
dataset contains information on a respondent’s place of living before the war and 
place of living at the moment of data collection in 2001. It does not have data on 
intermediate destinations of displaced people. So, it is not possible to say exactly 
what the first choice of displacement by these households was. For this reason, 
observations with value 2 (permanent residence – returned internally displaced 
person) and 3 (permanent status – returned refugee) from the question 9 of Module 8 
have been removed; 202 observations in total. For households with temporary 
residence, it can be said that their current status reflects their first displacement 
                                                                                                                                                          
households, thus the 2001 survey has been chosen as preferred because of the richness of the data from 5,400 
households. 
10 www.bhas.ba 
11 This is confirmed by the results of semi-structured interviews, as well. Most of the respondents have stated that 




decision, regardless of their possible movements between first and current place of 
displacement. 
The LSMS survey was conducted among individuals who were living in 
Bosnia in 2001, and thus included four sub-groups of displaced households: 
internally displaced; returned internally displaced; returned refugees; and returned 
refugees - internally displaced12. The survey conducted by the author (based on the 
LSMS) covered Bosnian refugees, in order to collect responses on migration decisions 
from this group as well. The survey was conducted via e-mail13, and 465 usable 
responses to the questionnaire were received.  
Since these two surveys were conducted at different times and primary 
interest of this paper is the situation in 1992, some changes to the responses were 
made. For example, all responses to the question on age were recalculated to obtain 
the respondent’s age in 1992. The responses to the question from the LSMS survey on 
the actual age of the respondent have shown that the oldest head of a household in 
the sample is 20 years old. On the basis of this, it has been decided to exclude all 
observations from our own survey where heads of a household were younger than 
20 in 1992, thus creating dataset of household which heads were also heads of 
household at the beginning of the war and were key decision maker in the 
displacement process, so their individual characteristics can be used along with a 
household’s characteristics. This way, the required information on 2798 households 
were available, including both those from the LSMS and from our own survey.  
Living in a municipality of type B has been used as a proxy variable for being 
displaced with no choice, thus suffering significant welfare losses. For own survey 
                                                 
12 Some refugees have not been able to return to the place of their pre-war living after they have been repatriated 
to Bosnia. Thus, their status is changed from “refugees” to “internally displaced”. In order to distinguish them 
from internally displaced who were not leaving their country during the war, these households were put into 
category called “refugees-internally displaced”. 
13 Here, it is necessary to acknowledge the bias of a survey based on e-mail, particularly regarding the average 
education, age and ethnic origin of the sample – the descriptive analysis of the data have shown that this group 
has more years of education, are younger and majority of them are Bosnians. But, a survey of a population 
currently living in more than 50 countries and all 5 continents could not have been conducted any other way. 
Also, these data were merged with LSMS data on returned refugees, and treated as a single “refugees” group, 




data, this variable has been created by combination of the data for a household’s 
ethnic origin and the ethnic group controlling a municipality during the war. 
Households of the same ethnic group as the one controlling a municipality were 
considered as living in a municipality of type A. All other ethnic groups were 
considered as living in a type B municipality. If a municipality was taken over by 
another ethnic group during the war, then all households from such municipalities 
were considered as living in a type B municipality. For the LSMS data, information 
on the ethnicity of a household were not available, so this variable was created by 
combining current displacement status of a household and their pre-war and current 
places of living. For example, those which stated that have not changed their place of 
living during the war, households from non-migrants group, were considered as 
living in type A municipality. For the internally displaced, their responses on 
municipalities of living immediately before the war and at the time of being 
interviewed were compared and conclusion on their ethnic origin made.  
  
Model 
  A model with three different choices available - to stay, to displace internally, 
or to migrate abroad – is analysed. Each of these decisions depends on a set of factors 
presented in the equation (6). These are initial income level, initial relative 
deprivation, relative deprivation after the displacement, and factors expected to 
influence both expected income losses of conflict and expected income gains of 
migration. 
  To analyse a model characterised by an unordered response dependent 
variable, which is a probability of making a particular migration decision, and with 
more than two possible migration decisions (three in our case - to stay, to displace 
internally, or to migrate abroad), the appropriate estimation method is multinomial 





  The probability that a utility maximising household will choose a particular 
type of displacement (either internal or international) is: 
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     (8) 
 
Where d* denotes migration type chosen, and d’ migration type not chosen. 
If the utility functions in equation (8) are substituted by their Taylor-series 
approximations, then the resulting equation is: 
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 If  wd is now replaced by X, a set of variables influencing the change in income, 
and rd is replaced by Z, a set of variables influencing the change in security, then the 
household’s probability of making a migration decision of particular type (the 
dependent variable of the model to be estimated) is: 
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where d* denotes two migration types, d*=2a is internal migration and d*=2b is 
international migration. The reference category is no migration. Since all the 
probabilities have to sum up to 1, the probability for the reference category is 
calculated as a difference between 1 and the calculated probabilities for the different 
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The data collected do not contain the information on the income and relative 
deprivation of a household. Level of education and gender of a household’s head are 
expected to capture the initial income of a household. In order to capture this effect 
more properly, the interactive variables between education and gender were also 
created. For relative deprivation, interactive variables between a household head’s 
education and place of living (whether it was urban, mixed or rural household) were 
created. Place of living was considered as a proxy for a community level income. The 
variable on the change in income has been created on the basis of information about 
the household’s education (as a proxy for its education) and the type of a 
municipality in which a household lived at the outset of war (whether it was type A 
or type B municipality). This should control for the influence of different degree of 
losses households which have been forcedly evicted suffered compared to other 




  The data collected and variables created enable us to estimate the following 
model, with two different specifications. The main reason for two different 
specifications is checking the sensitivity of results of the model to different design of 
the education variable. If we present education (EDU) as a continuous variable, we 
need to make strong assumption of equal spacing between different levels of 
education. Although it’s more straightforward to interpret single equation, we need 
to check for possibility of non-equal spacing14. In the first specification, education 
variable (EDU) is included into the Model 1 as a continuous variable on years of 
education of a household’s head, while in Model 2 it is presented as a single dummy 
variable on the tertiary education of a household’s head.   
Both specifications of the model to be estimated can be presented by following 
equation: 
 
i i i i i
i j i i i i i i
u D E M EDUURB EDUMIX URBAN MIXED EDUBMD
EDUF BMD EDU HHS E G A D M FE y
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ
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+ + + + + + =
β β β β β β
β β β β β β β
          ( 1 6 )    
         
where: 
i y ˆ – a dependent variable to be estimated, which in a context of a multinomial logit is 
a probability that a household will make a particular migration decision (to migrate 
internationally, to displace internally, or to stay), 
 FEMDi – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a head of household is female, 0 
if male, 
AGEi – age of a household head, in years, 
HHS – a variable for a household’s size, in number of household’s members, 
EDUi – a variable for the education level of a head of household, which is expressed 
in years in the Model 1, and as a single dummy variable for tertiary education in the 
Model 2, 
BMDi – a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a household’s head was living in a 
type B municipality immediately before the war, 0 otherwise, 
EDUFi – interactive variable between education and gender of a household’s head,  
                                                 
14 The model was also estimated by including a set of indicative varibles for the highest degree achieved by the 
household’s head. But, as only the varaib le for tertiary educaion level appeared to be statistically significant, it 




EDUBMDi – an interaction variable of EDU and BMD variables,  
MIXEDi and URBANi – a set of two indicative variables on different types of places 
of living, rural or urban, compared to rural place as a reference category 
EDUMIXi and EDUURBi – a set of two indicative variables for interaction between 
education and type of place of living (mixed or orban, rural place of living as a 
reference category), 
MEDi – migration experience dummy variable, taking the value 1 if a head of 
household place of living immediately before the war is different from her/his place 
of birth, 0 otherwise, 
ui – error term. 
 
  The base outcome in both specifications is set to be stay option, as the dataset 
contains most observation (more than 50%) on this option, compared to other two 
options. 
  Variables FEMD, AGE, EDU and interaction between FEMD and EDU are 
expected to capture the effect of initial income, while BMD variable and its 
interaction with EDU variables should capture the effect of different levels of change 
in income that affected different households. Interactive variables between EDU and 
two indicative variables for type of place of living (MIXED and URBAN) are the best 
possible proxies for relative deprivation of a household, taking into account 
limitations of the data available.  
Positive (negative) sign of coefficient on the education variable (EDU) should 
suggest that more educated households are more (less) likely to emigrate abroad, 
which would give an answer to our question about potential selection mechanism in 
the process of conflict-induced migration. This finding would be further supported 
by the cross-country analysis of determinants of the magnitude of brain drain. 
With regards to the household’s size (HHS), and gender of a household’s head 
(FEMDV), it is not quite clear what to expect a priori, because these variables may 
influence the migration decision in two different ways, affecting it in opposite 
direction. Household with more members and a female head may be more risk 




the other side, larger and female headed household may be less mobile and have 
higher family-level costs of displacement.  
Type of the municipality, related to the type of threat, whether it's the A or the 
B type of municipality, is determined by combination of information on a 
household's ethnic origin and place of living immediately before the war. The place 
of living immediately before the war is marked as being under control of a particular 
ethnic group by information gathered from different newspapers and TV stations on 
the history of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the municipality level. Then, 
households of the same ethnic group as the one controlling a municipality were 
defined as living in a type A municipality. Households from other ethnic group were 
characterised as living in type B municipality. If a municipality was changing ethnic 
group which is controlling it, due to military operations, then all households from 
such municipalities were defined as living in type B municipality. Obviously, this is 
not the perfect measure of the threat to households during the war. Some households 
decided to stay in their houses, in spite of the risk to their lives, and some decided to 
collaborate with new local government run by the different ethnic group. Still, 
according to the available data, it is acceptable that the suggested variable will 
capture the vast majority of cases, since more than 95% of households from 
municipalities controlled by other ethnic group were displaced during the war. 
A dummy variable on whether household head has changed her/his place of 
living between birth and 1992 (MED) has been created from responses to the 
question about their place of living when born and in 1992, in order to control for 
their migration experience. Here, we should expect a positive sign for the coefficient 










The multinomial logit estimation of two different specifications of the model 
has been performed15. The estimated relative risk ratios16 of the coefficients, and 
standard error in parentheses, are provided in the table below.  
 
Table 1. Regression results of multinomial logit models  
Variable 
name 
Variable description  Model 1  Model 2 
   2A17  2B 2A 2B 
FEMD  Gender of a household’s   1.66 1.12* 1.56*** 5.98*
 head  (1.11) (0.01) (0.43) (1.52)
AGE  0.97* 0.87* 0.98** 0.87*
 
Age of a household’s head 
(0.01)* (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
HHS  1.04 1.10 1.05 1.12***
 
Size of a household 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
EDU  0.95* 1.53* 1.23 1.18*
 
Education of household’s head 
(0.04) (0.13) (1.23) (1.12)
EDUF  Interaction variable between   0.99 0.84* 0.88  0.34*
  EDU and FEMD  (0.05) (0.06) (0.46)  (0.13)
EDUBMD  Interaction variable between   0.89 1.15* 0.81  1.46
  EDU and BMD  (0.08) (0.12) (0.07)  (1.24)
MIXED         Mixed place of living  0.01*** 0.01** 0.53  0.55
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.29)  (0.33)
URBAN         Urban place of living  0.43 0.35 0.85  3.43*
   (0.30) (0.36) (0.23)  (0.99)
EDUMIX        EDU - MIXED  1.60*** 1.93** 1.42  6.94
   (0.45) (0.54) (2.50)  (9.94)
EDUURB        EDU - URBAN  1.05 1.18** 0.59  0.67
   (0.06) (0.10) (0.59)  (0.62)
MED  Migration experience of a    0.21* 0.15* 0.20*  0.14*
 household’s  head  (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)  (0.02)
 Number  of  observations  2272  2272
  Log likelihood  -800.587  -842.84
* significant at 1% level of significance 
** significant at 5% level of significance 
*** significant at 10% level of significance 
                                                 
15 Detailed regression results are available from the author at the request. 
16 Relative risk ratios are exponential values of multinomial logit model coefficients, rrr=ecoeff. This means that the 
values of estimated coefficients above 1 should be interpreted similar to positive values of the classical OLS 
coefficients, and values below 1 as negative values. If the value of a coefficient is above 1, then the likelihood of 
the certain outcome compared to the base outcome is higher, and if the value is below 1, it’s lower. 
17 Results in columns named 2A are results from multinomial logit for the outcome „internal migration“, and 




Results of Model 1, with education (EDU) presented as a continuous variable 
on years of education, are presented in columns 3 and 4 of the table. Results of Model 
2, where education variable is presented as a single dummy variable for tertiary 
education, are presented in columns 5 and 6. Columns 3 and 5 of the table present the 
estimated coefficients for internal migration from two models, compared to base 
outcome 0, which is non-migration. Columns 4 and 6 part of the table present the 
estimated coefficients for international migration from two models, also compared to 
base outcome of non-migration.  
  Positive sign and statistical significance of the marginal effects of the 
household head’s gender (FEMD) for decision to migrate internationally relative to 
decision to stay, along with its insignificance for the internal migration outcome, 
suggests that household with female head of household are more likely to migrate 
internationally than internally. This may not be (only) due to the different risk 
assessment and aversion towards risk by female heads of a household, but due also 
to the mobilization of male heads of households into the army, which may reduce 
their mobility. The opposite situation is with the marginal effects for the age variable 
(AGE), which appear negative and statistically significant in both models and for 
both outcomes. This can be interpreted as an indication that the age of household’s 
head reduces mobility of the household, i.e. that households with older household 
head are more likely to stay than to migrate. Previous migration experience of a 
household's head surprisingly appears to be negative and significant in all models. 
  The positive sign of marginal effect for education (EDU), either expressed in 
years of education or as a dummy variable for tertiary education, in the case of 
international migration relative to non-migration, and negative sign for internal 
migration relative to non-migration, suggests the possibility of self-selection of 
conflict-induced migrants in terms of their observable skills. This is contrary to 
assumptions made by Chiswick (2000) and Ibanez and Velez (2003), and in line with 




  A dummy variable that captures degree of change in absolute income during 
the war, capturing the information whether a household has been displaced with 
non-optional choice, thus loosing most of its pre-war assets, appears to be statistically 
insignificant. Moreover, the interaction term between education and forced eviction 
dummy (EDUBMD) is statistically significant in the first model and for international 
migration only. The sign of the marginal effect for this variable is positive, as would 
be predicted from the theoretical model. We could say that, once being displaced, 
households with a more educated head are more likely to displace abroad than to 
stay. This supports the idea from the theoretical model developed in this study that 
more educated households have stronger incentive to restore their pre-war well-
being18, thus being more likely to migrate abroad. 

















                                                 






  The main contribution of this study is an attempt to develop a theoretical 
model of conflict-induced migration, which would capture its specific features that 
distinguish this from other types of migration. This model has been developed from 
the observations on the displacement process from Bosnia gathered from semi-
structured interviews, thus incorporating specific features of this case into the 
theoretical model. Such a model then served as a basis for empirical analysis of the 
data collected among Bosnian households. Although being developed to capture the 
specific case of displacement from Bosnia, characteristics of this case still make it 
more general and applicable to other cases as well. These cases include not only 
conflict-induced, but to a certain extent also development and natural disasters 
induced displacement events. 
  In order to analyse possible self-selection mechanism of conflict-induced 
displacement, within a framework of the theoretical model developed previously, 
this study provides micro-level analysis of determinants of migration from Bosnia, 
based on the household surveys. Results from this study support the idea of possible 
positive self-selection mechanism of conflict-induced migration, since they suggest 
that more educated individuals are more likely to displace internationally, instead of 
internally, during a conflict. 
  These findings suggest that conflict do not only produce increased emigration 
figures, but also may increase proportion of tertiary educated individuals. It needs to 
be taken into account in the analysis of the overall consequences of conflict, as 
human capital depletion will have significant negative impact on the post-conflict 
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